Plato, *Parmenides* 145b3-e6

(Space is a consequence of substance)

– Καὶ σχήματος δὴ τινός, ὡς ἐοίκε, τοιοῦτον ὅν μετέχοι ἂν τὸ ἐν, ἡτοι εὐθέος ἢ στρογγύλου ἢ τινὸς μεικτοῦ ἢ ἄμφοιν.
– Μετέχοι γὰρ ἂν.
– Ἄρ’ οὖν οὕτως ἔχον οὐκ αὐτῷ τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔσται καὶ ἐν ἱλλῳ;
– Πῶς;
– Τὸν μερὸν που ἐκκατον ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ ἐστὶ καὶ οὔδὲν ἐκτὸς τοῦ ὅλου.
– Οὕτω.
– Πάντα δὲ τὰ μέρη ὑπὸ τοῦ ὅλου περιέχονται;
– Ναί.
– Καὶ μὴν τὰ γε πάντα μέρη τὰ αὐτοῦ τὸ ἐν ἐστὶ, καὶ οὔτε τὰ πλέον οὔτε ἐλαττών ἢ πάντα.
– Οὐ γὰρ.
– Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ὅλον τὸ ἐν ἐστιν;
– Πῶς δ’ οὐ;
– Εἰ ἡρὰ πάντα τὰ μέρη ἐν ὅλῳ τυγχάνει ὄντα, ἐστὶ δὲ τὰ τε πάντα τὸ ἐν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ὅλον, περιέχονται δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὅλου τὰ πάντα, ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐνός ἐν περιέχοιτο τὸ ἐν, καὶ οὕτως ἂν ἢδη τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἰη.
– Φαίνεται.
– Ἀλλὰ μέντοι τὸ γε ὅλον αὐτὸ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς μέρεσιν ἐστιν, οὔτε ἐν πάσιν οὔτε ἐν τινὶ, εἰ γὰρ ἐν πάσιν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν ἑνί ἐν τινὶ γὰρ ἑνὶ μὴ ἐν οὐκ ἐν ἑτεῖ που δύναιτο ἐν ἑν ἀρκαίνην εἶναι: εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὲν τὸ ἐν τοῦ ἀπαντῶν ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ ὅλον ἐν τούτῳ μὴ ἐν, πῶς ἐτε ἐν γε τοῖς πᾶσιν ἐνέσται;
– Οὐδαμῶς.
– Οὐδὲ μὴν ἐν τισὶ τῶν μερῶν· εἰ γὰρ ἐν τισὶ τὸ ὅλον εἰη, τὸ πλέον ἂν ἐν τῷ ἐλάττων εἰη, δ’ ἐστιν ἀδύνατον.
– Ἀδύνατον γὰρ.
– Μὴ ἐν δ’ ἐν πλέοσιν μὴδ’ ἐν ἑνὶ μηδ’ ἐν ἀρκαίνην τοῖς μέρεσι τὸ ὅλον οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἐν ἑτερῳ τινὶ εἶναι· η μηδαμοῦ ἐτε εἶναι;
– Ἀνάγκη.
– Οὐκοῦν μηδαμοῦ μὲν ἐν οὐδὲν ἐν εἰη. ὅλον δὲ ἐν, ἐπειδ’ οὐκ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστιν, ἀνάγκη ἐν ἱλλῳ εἶναι;
– Being this kind of thing, it seems that the one would share in some sort of shape, either straight or round or a mixture of both.
– It would.
– This then being the case, would it not be in itself and in another?
– How so?
– Each part somehow is in the whole and none is outside the whole.
– Yes.
– And all the parts are contained by the whole?
– Yes.
– Indeed the one is all of its parts, and neither more nor less than all of them.
– No.
– And is not the one also the whole?
– No doubt.
– Since all the parts happen to be in the whole, and all the parts are the one as well as the whole itself, and all the parts are contained by the whole, the one would be contained by the one, and thus the one itself would be inside itself.
– It seems.
– But the whole is not in the parts, neither in all of them nor in any one in particular. If it were in all of them, it would also have to be in one; but because it is not in any one part, the whole cannot be in all of them; and if the one consists of all of them, but the whole is not in it, how can the whole be in all of them?
– No way.
– Nor is the whole in some of the parts, because if the whole were in some, the more would be in less, which is impossible.
– Impossible indeed.
– And by not being in several parts, or in one part, or in all the parts, must the whole either be inside another or be nowhere at all?
– It must.
– Being nowhere, it would be nothing, but given that it is whole and because it is not in
Πάνω γε.
– ἦν μὲν ἁρὰ τὸ ἐν ὄλοιν, ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐστὶν· ἢ δὲ τὰ πάντα μέρη ὅντα τυχάνει, αὐτὸ ἐν ἐαυτῷ· καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἐν ἄνγκη ἀυτὸ τε ἐν ἐαυτῷ εἶναι καὶ ἐν ἔτερῳ.
– Ἀνάγκη.

What next? Let’s see whether the one does or does not touch itself and the others.
– Let’s do it.
– The one itself was shown to be in itself as a whole somehow.
– Correct.
– And the one is also in the others?
– Yes.
– Insofar as it is in the others it would be touching the others; and insofar as it is in itself it would refrain from touching the others; but, as it is in itself, it would be touching itself.
– It appears.
– Thus the one would be touching both itself and the others.
– It would.
– What about this? Must not everything that is to touch something else lie next to that which it is to touch, and occupy that particular position which, by being next to the position that the other thing occupies, touches it?
– It must.
– So if the one is to touch itself it must lie directly next to itself and occupy that place which is next to that place in which the one itself is.
– It must indeed.
– But the one would accomplish these things if it were two and were in two places at once, but while it is one, it cannot.
– Indeed it cannot.
– It is by the same necessity that the one is not two that it does not touch itself.
– The same.
– But it will not touch the others either.

Plato, Parmenides 148d5-149d7
(Substance creates nested-manifold space)
– Ὅτι, φαμέν, τὸ μέλλον ἀψεῦθαι χωρὶς ἰν ἑφέξεις δὲ ἐκεῖνο εἶναι οὐ μέλλει ἀψεῦθαι, τρίτον δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν μέσῳ μηδὲν εἶναι.
– Ἀληθῆ.
– Δύο ἄρα δὲ τὸ ὀλίγιστον εἶναι, εἰ μέλλει ἄψεις εἶναι.
– Δεῖ.
– Ἔιαν δὲ τοῖν δυοῖν ὅροιν τρίτον προσγένηται ἐξῆς, αὐτὰ μὲν τρία ἔσται, αἱ δὲ ἄψεις δύο.
– Ναί.
– Καὶ οὖσα δὴ ἄει ἐνὸς προσγιγνυ-μένου μία καὶ ἄψεις προσγένεται, καὶ συμβαίνει τὰς ἄψεις τοῦ πλήθους τῶν ἄριθμον μιὰ ἐλάττους εἶναι.
– ὡ γάρ τα πρώτα δύο ἐπιλεονέκ-τησεν τῶν ἄψεων εἰς τὸ πλέον εἶναι τὸν ἄριθμον ἡ τὰς ἄψεις, τὸ ἵσοι τούτω καὶ ὁ ἔπειτα ἄριθμος πάς πα-σὸν τῶν ἄψεων πλεονεκτεί· ἢ ὅτι γάρ τὸ λοιπὸν ἄμα ἐν τῷ ἄριθμῳ προσγένεται καὶ μία ἄψεις ταῖς ἄψεσιν.
– Ἐρθοῦ.
– Ὅσα ἄρα ἐστίν τὰ ὄντα τὸν ἄριθμον, ἄει μιὰ αἱ ἄψεις ἐλάττους εἰσίν αὐτῶν.
– Ἀληθῆ.
– Εἰ δὲ γε ἐν μονὸν ἐστίν, δυὰς δὲ μὴ ἐστίν, ἄψεις οὐκ ἄν εἰη.
– Πῶς γάρ;
– Οὔκουν, φαμέν, τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἔνος οὔτε ἐν ἐστίν οὔτε μετέχει αὐτοῦ, εἰπὲν ἄλλα ἐστίν.
– Οὔ γάρ.
– Οὔκ ἄρα ἐνεστίν ἄριθμός ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἐνὸς μὴ ἐνόντος ἐν αὐτοῖς.
– Πῶς γάρ;
– Οὔτ’ ἄρα ἐν ἐστὶ τὰ ἄλλα οὐτὲ δύο οὔτε ἄλλου ἄριθμοῦ ἔχοντα ὅνομα οὐδὲν.
– Οὔ.
– τὸ ἐν ἄρα μόνον ἐστίν ἐν, καὶ δυᾶς οὐκ ἄν εἰη.
– Οὔ φαίνεται.
– Ἀψε ἄρα οὐκ ἐστίν δυοῖν μὴ ἄντοιν.
– Οὔκ ἐστίν.
– Οὔτ’ ἄρα τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων ἄπτεται οὔτε τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἔνος ἐπεὶ ἄρισ ὅντις ἐστίν.
– Οὔ γάρ οὖν.
– Οὔτω δὴ κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα τὸ ἐν τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἄπτεται τε καὶ οὐχ ἄπτεται.
– Ἐσικέν.

– Why, exactly?
– Because we said that that which is to touch, being apart, must be next to what is be touched and there must be no third thing between them.
– True.
– There must be at least two if there is to be contact.
– There must.
– And if a third is attached to the two boundaries, there will be three and the contacts will be two.
– Yes.
– And likewise whenever one more is added one more contact is also added and as a result the contacts are always fewer by one than the number of the multitude. As the first two exceeded the contacts by being of greater number than the number of contacts, so also every subsequent number exceeds all the contacts by an equal excess, because every time one is subsequently added to the number at once one more contact is added to the contacts.
– Correct.
– So whatever the number of beings is, the contacts are one fewer than they.
– True.
– And if the one is alone and there is no dyad, there is no contact.
– Of course.
– We said that the others of the one neither are one, nor share in the one if indeed they are other.
– No they do not.
– So there is no number in the others since there is no one in them.
– No doubt.
– So the others are neither one nor two nor are named by any other number.
– No.
– So the one alone is one and there is no dyad.
– It appears not.
– Because there are no two, there is no contact.
– No.
– So neither does the one touch the others nor
do the others touch the one because there is no contact.
- Indeed not.
- So for all these reasons, the one both touches and does not touch both itself and the others.
- It seems so.

**Plato, *Timaeus*, various passages**

(Attempts to elaborate the character of space: *host, nurse, that which receives, mold, receiving mother, mother, all-receiving, manifold nurse, space, seat, winnowing basket, receptacle, nurturer*).

49a3: Now reason appears to compel us to attempt to bring to light, by means of arguments, a difficult and obscure eidos. What properties and what character must we assume it to possess? Most of all this: that it be the **host** of all becoming like a **nurse**. But although all this is true, it is still necessary to speak about it with greater clarity, which is difficult because, among other things it requires a preliminary discussion about fire and the other things along with fire.

50b6: The same argument holds for that nature **which receives** all bodies.

50c2: For by nature it lies there as the **mold** for everything, moved and shaped by what enters it, and because of it appearing now this way and now that. And those things which enter it and leave it are imitations of the eternals – formed from them in a marvelous and hard to describe fashion which we shall pursue another time.

50d3: And it would indeed be appropriate to compare the **receiving** to the **mother** ...

51a4: For this reason, then, we must call the **mother** and **host** of what has been created as visible and otherwise perceptible neither earth, nor air, nor fire, or water, nor anything of which these are made. But some invisible eidos, shapeless, **all-receiving**, partaking ...
51ε6-52δ4: τούτων δὲ οὕτως ἐχόντων ὁμολογητέον ἐν μὲν εἰναι τὸ κατὰ ταύτα εἰδός ἔχον, ἀγέννητον καὶ ἀνόλεθρον, οὕτε εἰς ἑαυτὸ εἰσδεχόμενον ἄλλο ἀλλοθεν οὕτε αὐτὸ εἰς ἄλλο ποι ἴον, ἀόρατον δὲ καὶ ἄλλως ἀναισθητον, τούτῳ δὴ νόησις εὑληχεν ἐπισκοπεῖν: τὸ δὲ ὁμόνυμον ὁμοίων τὸ ἑκάινω δεύτερον, αἰσθητόν, γεννητόν, πεφορημένον ἀεὶ, γγυνμένον τε ἐν τινὶ τόπῳ καὶ πάλιν ἑκείθεν ἀπολιθυμένον, δόξῃ μὲν αἰσθήσεως περιλήπτην: τρίτον δὲ αὐ γένος ὅν τὸ τῆς γώρας ἀεὶ, φθορὰν οὐ προσδεχόμενον, ἐδραν δὲ παρέχον ὅσα ἔχει γένεσιν πάσιν, αὐτῷ δὲ μετ’ ἀναισθησίας ἀπτὸν λογισμὸν τινὶ νόθῳ, μόνης πιστῶν, πρὸς δὴ καὶ ἀνερπολοῦμεν βλέποντες καὶ φαμεν ἀναγκαῖον εἰναι που τὸ ὅπως ἐν τινὶ τόπῳ καὶ κατέχον γώραν τινὰ, τὸ δὲ μήτ’ ἐν γῇ μήτε κατ’ οὐρανὸν οὐδὲν εἰναι. ταῦτα δὴ πάντα καὶ τούτων ἄλλα ἀδελφὰ περὶ τὴν ἁπάντην καὶ ἀληθῶς φύσιν ὑπάρχουσαν ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς ὀνειρότερους οὐ δυνατοὶ γιγανθεῖσθαι ἐγερθέντες διορίζομενοι τολμηθέσσειν, ὡς εἰκόνι μὲν, ἐπεὶ περ οὐδ’ αὐτὸ τούτῳ ἐφ’ ὧν γέγονεν ἐαυτῆς ἐστιν, ἑτέρου δὲ τινος ἀεὶ φέρεται φάντασμα, διὰ ταῦτα ἐν ἑτέρῳ προσθῆκε τινὶ γίγνεσθαι, οὕσιας ὀμοσχέδος ἀντεχουμενὴν, ἤ μηδὲν τὸ παρά παν αὐτὴν εἰναι, τὸ δὲ ὄντως ὅτι βοηθὸς ὁ δὲ ἀκίριεος ἀλήθης λόγος, ὡς ἔως ἃν τι τὸ μὲν ἄλλο ἤ, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο, οὐδέτερον ἐν οὐδετέρῳ ποτὲ γενόμενον ἐν ἀμα ταῦτα καὶ δύο γενήσεσθαι.

52δ5: Τόις δὲ γένισθαυς τθήμην ύπραινομένη καὶ πυρομένην καὶ τάς γῆς τε

51ε6-52δ4: This being the case, it must be admitted that there exists, first, the invariant eidos, unborn and indestructible, neither admitting anything into itself from outside, nor entering into anything else, invisible and incorruptible; it is this which noesis is tasked to oversee; second is that which has the same name and the same appearances as that eidos, is perceptible, created, always being moved, being born in a certain place and then vanishing from it, and can be grasped by opinion through the senses. The third kind is χώρα (“space”) which is eternal, does not admit destruction, provides a seat for all things that are born, itself can be grasped by a spurious kind of reasoning with lack of sensation, is scarcely credible, and as we look upon it we dream and say that everything that exists must necessarily be in some location and occupy some space, and that whatever is neither on the earth nor anywhere in heaven is nothing. Because of this dreaming state we become unable to awaken, to draw all these and other similar distinctions and speak the truth about the unsleeping and truly existing nature, namely that, as far as mere image is concerned, because it does not own even the very thing on which it was created, and because is the ever-wandering apparition of something else, it is appropriate to exist in something else, cling on to existence in some way or else be nothing at all – but that which is truly existent is aided by the precise and true argument that so long as two things are different, neither will ever become one with the other, nor will the two become one and the same at the same time.

According to my judgment, the argument, considered in summary, should be delivered as follows: there exist three distinct things, being, space and becoming, even before the creation of the universe.

52δ5: And the nurse of becoming, being moistened and inflamed and receiving the
καὶ ἀέρος μορφὰς δεχομένην, καὶ ὁσα ἄλλα τούτοις πάθη συνέπεται πάσχουσαν, παντοδαπὴν μὲν ἰδεῖν φαίνεσθαι, διὰ δὲ τὸ μήθ᾽ ὁμοῖον δυνάμεων μήτε ἰσορρόπον ἐμπίπτασθαι καὶ οὐδὲν αὐτῆς ἰσορροπεῖν, ἄλλ᾽ ἀνομιάλως πάντη ταλαντομένην σείεσθαι μὲν ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνων αὐτῆς, κινουμένην δ᾽ αὐτὸ πάλιν ἐκεῖνα σείειν. τὰ δὲ κινοῦμεν ἄλλα ἄλλοσε ἴσης φέρεσθαι διακρίνεσθαι, ὡσπερ τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν πλοκάνων τε καὶ ὅργανων τῶν περὶ τὴν τοῦ σίτου κάθαρσιν σείομενα καὶ ἀνικυμόμενα τὰ μὲν πυκνὰ καὶ μανά καὶ κοῦφα εἰς ἐτέραν ἶσης φερομέναν ἑδράν: τὸ οὕτω τὰ τέτταρα γένη σειόμενα ὑπὸ τῆς διακρίνεσθαι, κινουμένης αὐτῆς ὁμοίου πρὸς τὰς ἀλλὰ ἄλλα ἄλλην ἰσχεῖν, πρὸς καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἐξ αὐτῶν διακοσμηθὲν γενέσθαι

57c3: ... διὰ τὴν τῆς δεχομένης κίνησιν

88d6: ... ἤν τε τροφόν καὶ τιθήνην τοῦ παντὸς προσείπομεν ...